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We describe the epidemiology of highly pathogenic 
avian influenza (HPAI) A(H7N9) based on poultry mar-
ket environmental surveillance and laboratory-con-
firmed human cases (n = 9) in Guangdong, China. We 
also compare the epidemiology between human cases 
of high- and low-pathogenic avian influenza A(H7N9) 
(n = 51) in Guangdong. Case fatality and severity were 
similar. Touching sick or dead poultry was the most 
important risk factor for HPAI A(H7N9) infections and 
should be highlighted for the control of future influ-
enza A(H7N9) epidemics.
A novel avian influenza A(H7N9) virus emerged in 
mainland China in March 2013, and 1,533 human infec-
tions with 592 deaths have been reported to the World 
Health Organization as of June 2017 [1]. The virus was 
low-pathogenic to poultry but caused varying dis-
ease severity in humans and there was an increase 
in virus detection in poultry and humans during win-
ter [2-4]. There was a surge of human disease in the 
winter and spring period of 2016/17 with more than 500 
reported cases of influenza A(H7N9) [1], surpassing the 
maximum number (ca 300 cases) of the previous four 
epidemic waves [5]. The 2016/17 epidemic wave has 
extended to summer and not yet come to an end at the 
time of writing, much longer than the earlier epidemics. 
Before the 2016/17 winter wave, all influenza A(H7N9) 
viruses identified from poultry and humans were low-
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI). However, influenza 
A(H7N9) viruses isolated from two human cases in 
Guangdong in mid-February 2017 showed insertion of 
four amino acids at the cleavage site of the haemag-
glutinin protein, indicating that the virus had become 
highly pathogenic to chickens [6,7]. In this study, we 
report the prevalence of the highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI) A(H7N9) virus in Guangdong poultry 
markets through active surveillance and compare the 
epidemiological characteristics and clinical outcomes 
between the patients infected with the HPAI and LPAI 
A(H7N9) viruses in Guangdong province during the 
2016/17 season.
Environmental surveillance for influenza 
A(H7N9) virus and detection of HPAI and 
LPAI A(H7N9) human cases
Influenza A(H7N9) infection is a notifiable disease in 
mainland China. From 1 November 2016 through 31 
March 2017, a total of 60 RT-PCR laboratory-confirmed 
human influenza A(H7N9) cases were detected and 
reported to the Guangdong Provincial Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention (Guangdong CDC). All influenza 
A(H7N9)-positive samples were sent to Guangdong 
CDC for further discrimination between HPAI and LPAI 
A(H7N9) viruses by sequencing the connecting peptide 
region of the haemagglutinin gene; nine HPAI and 51 
LPAI A(H7N9) human cases were identified.
The H7 detection rate from environmental surveil-
lance [8] in the Guangdong live poultry markets (LPMs) 
increased in December 2016, and there was a surge 
in the number of reported influenza A(H7N9) human 
cases starting in mid-December 2016 (Figure).
HPAI A(H7N9) viruses were first identified in poultry 
markets in four of 21 cities in Guangdong in November 
2016; before that, only LPAI A(H7N9) viruses has been 
detected. The first patient infected with HPAI A(H7N9) 
viruses fell ill on 17 December 2016 (Figure) [9]. Genetic 
characterisation of HPAI A(H7N9) was carried out in 
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retrospect and thus, LPAI and HPAI A(H7N9) patients 
were managed in the same way. Different cities in 
Guangdong have implemented routine rest days in 
live poultry markets since 2013 and temporary mar-
ket closure for 3 to 14 days was also introduced in late 
February 2017, when the demand for chicken subsided 
after the Chinese New Year holiday and an increased 
number of human influenza A(H7N9) cases were 
reported in Guangdong and other provinces in China 
(Figure).
Comparison of HPAI and LPAI A(H7N9) 
human cases in Guangdong
During the study period, influenza A(H7N9) human 
cases were detected in 16 of 21 cities in Guangdong 
(Table 1). 
We collected demographic, epidemiological and clini-
cal data on influenza A(H7N9) cases using standardised 
forms. Collection and analyses of data from influenza 
A(H7N9) human cases were part of an ongoing public 
health investigation of emerging outbreaks and thus 
were exempt from institutional review board assess-
ment in China [10]. Descriptive analyses were carried 
out and multivariable analysis was fitted to a limited 
set of exposure variables. 
We compared the demographic characteristics of the 
hospitalised human cases infected with HPAI A(H7N9) 
(n = 9) vs LPAI A(H7N9) virus (n = 51) (Table 2). We found 
a higher proportion of HPAI A(H7N9) cases who were 
female (HPAI: 55.6% vs LPAI: 25.5%, Fisher’s exact 
test p = 0.111) and a lower proportion living in areas 
with strictly regulated poultry trading, where live poul-
try sales were banned and only trading of dressed or 
chilled poultry is allowed (HPAI: 0.0% vs LPAI: 23.5%, 
Fisher’s exact test p = 0.182). The median age was simi-
lar for HPAI and LPAI A(H7N9) cases.
The clinical presentation was similar and all reported 
influenza A(H7N9) cases were severe and required hos-
pitalisation (Table 2). However, fewer HPAI than LPAI 
Figure 
Epidemic curves for HPAI and LPAI A(H7N9) human cases, Guangdong province, 1 November 2016–31 March 2017 
(n = 60)
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A(H7N9) cases had underlying conditions (Fisher’s 
exact test p = 0.076). Significantly more HPAI A(H7N9) 
cases (77.8%) raised backyard poultry compared 
with LPAI A(H7N9) cases (29.4%; Fisher’s exact test 
p = 0.009). HPAI A(H7N9) cases were associated with 
touching live or dead poultry (Fisher’s exact test 
p = 0.010 and 0.005 respectively), while exposures to 
poultry markets were similar. By including touching 
live poultry and touching dead poultry respectively 
in two multivariable ridge logistic regression models 
along with raising backyard poultry, these exposures 
remained independently significant, and touching sick 
or dead poultry was the single most important risk fac-
tor for HPAI A(H7N9) infections (Table 3).
Fatality risks among hospitalised patients were simi-
lar and remained high (40–60%) for both LPAI and 
HPAI A(H7N9) cases. Duration from hospitalisation to 
admission to an intensive care unit (ICU) (p = 0.052) 
and from hospitalisation to discharge (p = 0.049) were 
significantly longer for HPAI A(H7N9) patients. Among 
patients who died, more HPAI A(H7N9) patients had 
duration from hospitalisation to death longer than 21 
days (HPAI: 3/5 vs LPAI: 2/22; p-value = 0.030).
Discussion
In this study, we described the prevalence of influenza 
A(H7N9) viruses in Guangdong poultry markets during 
the 2016/17 season and compared the demographi-
cal, epidemiological and basic clinical characteristics 
between the HPAI and LPAI A(H7N9) human cases. 
Since the end of the study period, two more influenza 
A(H7N9) cases have been identified in Guangdong but 
have yet to be characterised as HPAI or LPAI. Although 
the study was limited by a relatively small sample with 
9 HPAI and 51 LPAI A(H7N9) cases, comparing HPAI and 
LPAI A(H7N9) patients within Guangdong province pro-
vided a direct comparison by reducing potential impact 
of geographical heterogeneity in community exposure 
patterns to poultry, access to healthcare and clinical 
management [11].
We identified touching sick or dead poultry as the sin-
gle most important risk factor for HPAI A(H7N9) human 
infections, followed by raising backyard poultry and 
touching live poultry. Similar peptide sequences at the 
multiple basic amino acid cleavage site of HA have been 
reported for H7 viruses in Chile and Canada that were 
shown to be highly pathogenic in chickens by intrave-
nous pathogenicity tests [12]. Moreover, a recent study 
demonstrated that the insertion of the four amino 
acids in this region enabled trypsin-independent 
infectivity of this virus [13]. This observation strongly 
implicates that the new identified HPAI A (H7N9) virus 
has a high virulence phenotype in chicken. In general, 
HPAI viruses in poultry disseminate to multiple organs 
including muscle, whereas LPAI viruses are restricted 
to the respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts. Thus, 
HPAI A(H7N9) virus-infected poultry carcasses may be 
more infectious to humans than poultry infected with 
LPAI A(H7N9). These findings support our analysis that 
the major route of transmitting the HPAI A(H7N9) virus 
to humans will be through the contact of sick or dead 
rather than healthy poultry. However, the pathogenic-
ity of chickens with HPAI A(H7N9) infection needs to be 
investigated urgently. 
Clinical outcomes were comparable between hospi-
talised HPAI and LPAI A(H7N9) cases, except that the 
time from hospitalisation to discharge were longer for 
HPAI A(H7N9) cases. The importance of avoiding touch-
ing sick and dying poultry should be highlighted to the 
public for the control of HPAI A(H7N9). Among those 
raising backyard poultry, 10 of 22 reported touching 
sick or dead poultry, while none reported touching sick 
or dead poultry among the 38 not raising backyard 
poultry. Strengthening awareness of the risks of back-
yard poultry will be crucial in the control of future HPAI 
A(H7N9) epidemics, especially since recent A(H7N9) 
cases have shifted to rural areas where backyard poul-
try is more prevalent [5].
We observed longer average hospital stays for HPAI 
A(H7N9) patients although there was no difference in 
clinical progression and outcome between HPAI and 
LPAI A(H7N9) patients. However, since there was no 
Table 1
Geographical location of the HPAI and LPAI A(H7N9) 
human cases detected in Guangdong province, 1 
November 2016–31 March 2017 (n = 60)
Citya HPAI A(H7N9) n = 9
LPAI A(H7N9) 
n = 51
Guangzhou 1 12
Shenzhen 0 6
Dongguan 0 4
Foshan 0 5
Zhanjiang 0 0
Jieyang 1 2
Maoming 0 0
Shantou 0 0
Huizhou 0 4
Jiangmen 0 5
Meizhou 0 2
Zhaoqing 2 1
Qingyuan 2 1
Zhongshan 1 3
Heyuan 1 0
Shanwei 0 1
Shaoguan 1 1
Chaozhou 0 3
Yangjiang 0 0
Yunfu 0 1
Zhuhai 0 0
HPAI: highly pathogenic avian influenza; LPAI: low-pathogenic 
avian influenza.
a By descending order of population size.
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Table 2
Characteristics of laboratory-confirmed HPAI and LPAI A(H7N9) human cases detected in Guangdong province, 1 
November 2016–31 March 2017 (n = 60)
Characteristics
HPAI A(H7N9) 
n = 9
LPAI A (H7N9) 
n = 51
  
  
p valuebn % 95% CI a n % 95% CI a
Median age (in years with IQR) 57 years 45–63 56 years 49–67 0.780
Male sex 4 44 14–79 38/51 75 60–86 0.111
Poultry worker 0 0 0–34 3/51 6 1–16 1.000
Residence in area with strictly regulated poultry trading 0 0 0–34 12/51 24 13–37 0.182
Exposure to live poultryc
Any exposure to live poultry 7 78 40–97 30/51 59 44–72 0.460
Touched live poultry 7 78 40–97 15/50 30 18–45 0.010
Bought live poultry 0 0 0–34 15/50 30 18–45 0.095
Prepared live poultry 3 33 7–70 9/50 18 9–31 0.369
Consumed live poultry 4 44 14–79 12/50 24 13–38 0.236
Raising backyard poultry 7 78 40–97 15/51 29 17–44 0.009
Exposure to sick or dead poultryc
Any exposure to sick or dead poultry 6 67 30–93 5/50 10 3–22 0.001
Within 1 m of sick of dead poultry 1 11 0–48 0/50 0 0–7 0.153
Touched sick or dead poultry 5 56 21–86 5/50 10 3–22 0.005
Consumed sick or dead poultry 1 11 0–48 0/50 0 0–7 0.153
Exposure to poultry marketsc
Visited retail LPM 5 56 21–86 31/50 62 47–75 0.726
Visited wholesale LPM 1 11 0–48 9/48 19 9–33 1.000
Visited dressed poultry market 0 0 0–34 1/48 2 0–11 1.000
Symptoms
Fever 8 89 52–100 47/51 92 81–98 0.570
Cough 8 89 52–100 44/51 86 74–94 1.000
Sore throat 1 11 0–48 13/51 26 14–40 0.671
Weakness 6 67 30–93 19/51 37 24–52 0.145
Muscle pain 4 44 14–79 10/51 20 10–33 0.193
Shortness of breath 0 0 0–34 6/51 12 4–24 0.578
Diarrhoea 0 0 0–34 2/51 4 0–13 1.000
Underlying conditions 2 22 3–60 29/51 57 42–71 0.076
Pneumonia 9 100 66–100 51/51 100 93–100 1.000
ICU admission 8 89 52–100 45/51 88 76–96 1.000
Died 5 56 21–86 22/51 43 29–58 0.718
Median incubation periodd (in days with 95% CI) 5.2 2.8–9.7 3.8 3.0–4.6 0.619
Median durations (in days with IQR)
Onset to laboratory confirmation 8.0 6.0–11.0 8.0 6.0–10.0 0.700
Onset to hospitalisation 3.0 1.0–5.0 4.0 3.0–5.0 0.451
Hospitalisation to ICU admission 2.0 1.8–2.0 1.0 1.0–2.0 0.052
Hospitalisation to death 28.0 3.0–30.0 8.0 5.3–11.5 0.434
Hospitalisation to discharge 29.0 26.8–37.0 20.0 14.8–26.0 0.049
CI: confidence interval; HPAI: highly pathogenic avian influenza; ICU: intensive care unit; IQR: interquartile range; LPAI: low-pathogenic avian 
influenza; LPM: live poultry market. 
a CIs shown for percentages unless otherwise indicated.
b Fisher’s exact test for categorical variables, Wilcoxon signed rank test for continuous variables, and likelihood ratio test under accelerated 
failure time model for incubation periods.
c In the 10 days before symptom onset.
d Based on log-normal distribution, accounting for interval censoring of poultry or LPM exposure.
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statistically significant difference in admission to ICU 
and clinical outcomes between HPAI and LPAI A(H7N9) 
patients, we still cannot determine whether the HPAI 
A(H7N9) viruses caused higher severity in patients. 
That LPAI A(H7N9) patients had a shorter duration from 
hospitalisation to ICU admission and a smaller propor-
tion with long duration from hospitalisation to death 
may be partially explained by the higher frequency of 
underlying conditions in this group. Detailed clinical 
investigation of virus shedding, virus dissemination 
and the levels of inflammation may be able to shed 
light on these questions.
Our analysis only focused on the comparison among 
severe influenza A(H7N9) patients. In earlier epidem-
ics, a spectrum of cases from of asymptomatic to mild 
and severe was detected in Guangdong [3], however in 
the more recent epidemic waves in China, the detected 
cases tended to be more severe [11]. Therefore, our 
understanding of the full range of severities of the HPAI 
A(H7N9) infections is still incomplete.
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Table 3
Multivariable logistic ridge regression analysis of risk 
factors for HPAI compared with LPAI A(H7N9) human 
infections (n = 60)
Exposure
HPAI A(H7N9) infections 
AOR (95% CI)
Model 1 Model 2
Raise backyard poultry 2.13 (1.02–6.06) 1.97 (1.01–6.33)
Touched live poultry 2.11 (1.01–5.76) Not entered
Touched sick or dead 
poultry Not entered 5.35 (1.09–32.60)
AOR: adjusted odds ratio; CI: confidence interval; HPAI: highly 
pathogenic avian influenza; LPAI: low-pathogenic avian influenza.
